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Abstract
We exploit quantier elimination in the global design of combined decision and
semi-decision procedures for theories over non-disjoint signatures, thus providing in
particular extensions of Nelson-Oppen results.
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1 Introduction and Background
Quantier elimination has been considered, since the early times of modern
symbolic logic, a powerful technique for decision procedures. Even in actual
approaches to combination problems (see e.g. [9]), specic quantier elimi-
nation algorithms are often invoked as specialized reasoners to be integrated
within a exible general setting dealing with multiple theories. This happens,
in particular, whenever numerical constraints problems need to be adequately
addressed: examples of such specialized reasoners are the Fourier-Motzkin
quantier elimination procedure for linear rational arithmetic or Cooper's
quantier elimination procedure for integer Presburger arithmetic.
In contrast to this local call for quantier elimination algorithms, we shall
address in this paper quantier elimination as a global design opportunity for
integrated provers: we shall show in particular how it can be used in order
to extend Nelson-Oppen combination procedure [11], [13], [16] to non-disjoint
signatures. Detailed proofs of the results presented here, as well as additional
information, can be found in [6].
A signature  is a set of functions and predicate symbols (each of them
endowed with the corresponding arity). We assume the binary equality pred-
icate symbol = to be always present in . The signature obtained from  by
the addition of a set of new constants (= 0-ary function symbols) X is denoted
1
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by  [ X or by 
X
. We have the usual notions of -term, (full rst order)
-formula, -atom, -literal, -clause, -positive clause, etc.: e.g. atoms are just
atomic formulas, literals are atoms and their negations, clauses are disjunc-
tions of literals, positive clauses are disjunctions of atoms. Letters ;  ; : : :
are used for formulas, whereas letters A;B; : : : are used for literals and letters
C;D; : : : are used for clauses. Terms, literals and clauses are called ground
whenever variables do not appear in them. Formulas without free variables
are called sentences. A -theory T is a set of sentences (called the axioms of
T ) in the signature ; however when we write T  T
0
for theories, we may
mean not just set-theoretic inclusion but the fact that all the axioms for T
are logical consequences of the axioms for T
0
.
>From the semantic side, we have the standard notion of a -structure A:
this is nothing but a support set endowed with an arity-matching interpre-
tation of the predicate and function symbols from . We shall notationally
confuse, for the sake of simplicity, a structure with its support set. Truth of
a -formula in A is dened in any one of the standard ways (so that truth of
a formula is equivalent to truth of its universal closure). A -structure A is
a model of a -theory T (in symbols A j= T ) i all axioms of T are true in
A; for models of a -theory T we shall preferably use the letters M;N ; : : :
to distinguish them from arbitrary -structures. If  is a formula, T j=  (`
is a logical consequence of T ') means that  is true in any model of T . A
-theory T is complete i for every -sentence , either  or : is a logical
consequence of T ; T is consistent i it has a model (i.e. i T 6j= ?).
An embedding between two -structures A and B is any map f : A  ! B
among the corresponding support sets satisfying the condition
() A j= A i B j= A
for all 
A
atoms A (here A is regarded as a 
A
-structure by interpreting
each a 2 A into itself and B is regarded as a 
A
-structure by interpreting
each a 2 A into f(a)). Notice that, as we have identity in the language, an
embedding is an injective function (it also must preserve the interpretation of
the function symbols and, in case it is just an inclusion, the interpretation of
the predicate symbols in the smaller structure must be the restriction of the
corresponding interpretation in the bigger structure). In case () holds for all
rst order formulas, the embedding is said to be elementary.
The main problems we deal with are word problems, more precisely, given
a -theory T :
- the word problem for T is that of deciding whether T j= A holds for a -atom
A;
- the conditional word problem for T is that of deciding whether T j= C holds
for a Horn -clause C;
- the clausal word problem for T is that of deciding whether T j= C holds for
a -clause C;
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- the elementary word problem for T is that of deciding whether T j=  holds
for a rst order -formula .
A formula is quantier-free i it does not contain quantiers. A -theory T
is said to eliminate quantiers i for every formula (x)
2
there is a quantier-
free formula 
0
(x) such that T j= (x) $ 
0
(x): There are many well-known
theories [4] eliminating quantiers, we give here some examples which can be
of interest for software verication.
Example 1.1 Linear integer arithmetic (i.e. the theory of the structure of
integer numbers in the signature +; 0; 1;;
n
) eliminates quantiers; so does
rational linear arithmetic (i.e. the theory of rational numbers in the signature
+; 0;). Another well-known classical example from Tarski is real arithmetic
(i.e. the theory of real numbers in the signature +; 0; ; 1;).
Example 1.2 The theory of acyclic binary lists L [13], [14] eliminates quan-
tiers (see [6]).
The main ingredient of this paper is the well-known notion of a model
completion of a theory. There are good chapters on that in all texbooks from
Model Theory. We shall recall here just the essential denitions for the only
case of universal theories
3
which is the relevant one for the purposes of this
paper (readers may consult e.g. [4], [10], [18] for further information).
Let T be a universal -theory and let T

 T a further -theory; we say
that T

is a model completion of T i i) every model of T has an embedding
into a model of T

and ii) T

eliminates quantiers.
It can be shown that a model completion T

of a theory T is unique, in
case it exists, and moreover that T

has a set of 89-axioms, see [4].
Example 1.3 The theory of an innite set is the model completion of pure
equality theory; the theory of dense total orders without endpoints is the
model completion of the theory of total orders.
Example 1.4 There are many classical examples from algebra: the theory
of algebraically closed elds is the model completion of the theory of inter-
gral domains, the theory of divisible torsion free abelian groups is the model
completion of the theory of torsion free abelian groups, etc.
Example 1.5 The theory of atomless Boolean algebras
4
is the model com-
pletion of the theory of Boolean algebras (for model completions arising in the
algebra of logic, see the book [8]).
Example 1.6 An old result in [18] says, in particular, that universal Horn
theories T in nite signatures always have a model completion, provided the
2
By this notation, we mean that  contains free variables only among the nite set x.
3
Recall that a universal theory T is a theory having as axioms only universal closures of
quantier-free formulas.
4
We recall that an atom in a Boolean algebra is a minimal non-zero element; a Boolean
algebra is atomless i it has no atoms.
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following two conditions are satised: a) nitely generated models of T are all
nite; b) amalgamation property holds for models of T . This fact can be used
in order to prove the existence of a model completion for theories axiomatizing
many interesting discrete structures (like graphs, posets, etc.).
Example 1.7 It follows from the quantier elimination result reported in [6]
that the theory L of acyclic binary lists is the model completion of itself.
Example 1.8 If a theory T

has elimination of quantiers, then it is the
model completion of the theory T axiomatized by the set of universal sentences
which are logical consequences of T , see [4].
2 Compatibility
The key ingredient for our combination procedures is the following notion:
Denition 2.1 Let T be a theory in the signature  and let T
0
be a universal
theory in a subsignature 
0
 . We say that T is T
0
-compatible i
(i) T
0
 T ;
(ii) T
0
has a model-completion T

0
;
(iii) every model of T embeds into a model of T [ T

0
.
Condition (iii) can be equivalently given in a slightly dierent form, by
saying that every quantier-free -formula which is false in a model of T is
false also in a model of T [ T

0
.
Example 2.2 According to this remark, it is evident that T
0
-compatibility re-
duces to the standard notion of stable inniteness (used in the disjoint Nelson-
Oppen combination procedure) in case T
0
is the pure theory of equality:
5
recall
in fact that in this case T

0
(i.e. the model completion of the pure equality
theory) is the theory of an innite set.
Example 2.3 Every theory including the theory L of acyclic binary lists is
compatible with L, because L is universal and L = L

.
Example 2.4 If T
0
has a model completion T

0
and if T  T

0
, then T is
certainly T
0
-compatible: this trivial case is often interesting (we may take e.g.
T
0
to be the theory of linear orders and T to be real aritmetic or rational
linear arithmetic).
Example 2.5 Let T
0
be a universal theory having a model completion T

0
;
if T is any extension of T
0
with free function symbols only, then T is T
0
-
compatible.
More examples will be supplied in section 4. An interesting feature of
T
0
-compatibility is that it is a modular property:
5
By the `pure theory of equality' we mean the empty theory in the signature containing
only the equality predicate.
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Proposition 2.6 Let T
1
be a 
1
-theory and let T
2
be a 
2
-theory; suppose
they are both compatible with respect to a 
0
-theory T
0
(where 
0
:= 
1
\
2
).
Then T
1
[ T
2
is T
0
-compatible too.
3 Combining compatible theories
Let us progressively x our main data for the whole paper.
Assumption (I). T
1
is a theory in the signature 
1
and T
2
is a theory in the
signature 
2
; 
0
is the signature 
1
\ 
2
.
Our main aim is that of (semi)deciding the clausal word problem for T
1
[
T
2
, given that the corresponding clausal word problems for T
1
and T
2
are
(semi)decidable. Equivalently, this amounts to (semi)decide the consistency
of
T
1
[ T
2
[  ;
where   is a nite set of ground literals in the signature 
1
[ 
2
, expanded
with a nite set of new Skolem constants.
  can be puried: as usual, we can abstract alien subterms and add equa-
tions involving further new free constants, in such a way that our problem is
reduced to the problem of establishing the consistency of a set of sentences
like
(1) (T
1
[  
1
) [ (T
2
[  
2
);
where  
1
; 
2
are as explained in the following:
Assumption (II). For nitely many new free constants a,  
1
is a nite set
of ground literals in the signature 
a
1
and  
2
is a nite set of ground literals
in the signature 
a
2
.
For trivial reasons, the consistency of (1) cannot follow from the mere
separate consistency of T
1
[  
1
and of T
2
[  
2
. We need some information
exchange between a reasoner dealing with T
1
[ 
1
and a reasoner dealing with
T
2
[  
2
.
Craig's interpolation theorem for rst order logic ensures that the incon-
sistency of (1) can be detected by the information exchange of a single 
a
0
-
sentence  such that T
1
[ 
1
j=  and T
2
[ 
2
[fg j= ?. However, as pointed
out in [15], this observation is not very useful, as  might be any rst-order
formula, whereas we would like - at least -  to be quantier-free.
Unfortunately, information exchange of quantier-free 
a
0
-formulas alone
is not suÆcient, even for syntactically simple T
1
and T
2
, to establish the in-
consistency of (1) (see section 5 below for a counterexample). We so need a
further assumption in order to get limited information echange without aect-
ing refutational completeness (this is the relevant assumption we make, the
other two being mere notational conventions):
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Assumption (III). There is a universal 
0
-theory T
0
such that both T
1
and
T
2
are T
0
-compatible.
A nite list C
1
; : : : ; C
n
of positive ground 
a
0
-clauses such that for every
k = 1; : : : ; n, there is i = 1; 2 such that
T
i
[  
i
[ fC
1
; : : : ; C
k 1
g j= C
k
:
is called a positive residue chain. We can now formulate our combination
results (see [6] for proofs):
Theorem 3.1 In the above assumptions, (T
1
[ 
1
)[ (T
2
[ 
2
) is inconsistent
i there is a positive residue chain C
1
; : : : ; C
n
such that C
n
is the empty clause.
Thus inconsistency can be detected by repeated exchanges of positive
ground clauses only; if we allow information exchange consisting on ground
quantier free formulas, a single exchange step is suÆcient:
Theorem 3.2 In the above assumptions, (T
1
[ 
1
)[ (T
2
[ 
2
) is inconsistent
i there is a ground quantier-free 
a
0
-sentence  such that
T
1
[  
1
j=  and T
2
[  
2
[ fg j= ?:
Following [15], we say that our T
i
's are 
0
-convex i whenever it happens
that T
i
[  
i
j= A
1
_    _A
n
(for n  1 and for ground 
a
0
-atoms A
1
; : : : ; A
n
),
then there is k = 1; : : : ; n such that T
i
[  
i
j= A
k
.
6
For 
0
-convex theories,
Theorem 3.1 renes in the following way:
Corollary 3.3 In addition to the above assumptions, suppose also that T
1
; T
2
are both 
0
-convex. Then (T
1
[  
1
) [ (T
2
[  
2
) is inconsistent i there is
a positive residue chain C
1
; : : : ; C
n
in which C
1
; : : : ; C
n 1
are all ground 
0
-
atoms and C
n
is ?.
4 The locally nite case
We say that a 
0
-universal theory T
0
is locally nite i 
0
is nite and for ev-
ery nite set a of new free constants, there are nitely many 
a
0
-ground terms
t
1
; : : : ; t
k
a
such that for every further 
a
0
-ground term u, we have T
0
j= u = t
i
(for some i = 1; : : : ; k
a
).
7
As we are mainly dealing with computational as-
pects, we consider part of the denition the further request that such t
1
; : : : ; t
k
a
6
Among 
0
-convex theories we have the important class of universal Horn theories, see
[15] again.
7
Local niteness is a much weaker requirement than the notion of `nitary modulo a
renaming' introduced in [2]. The reason is because the number k
a
depends on the cardinality
of a; on the contrary a 
0
-theory T is said to be nitary modulo a renaming i there is a
nite set of 
0
-terms S such that for every 
0
-term u there are t 2 S and a renaming  such
that T j= u = t. Consequently, for instance, locally nite theories (like Boolean algebras)
in which the number k
a
grows more than polynomially in the cardinality of a cannot be
nitary modulo a renaming.
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are eectively computable from a. Examples of locally nite theories are the
theory of graphs, of partial orders (more generally, any theory whose signature
does not contain function symbols), of commutative idempotent monoids, of
Boolean algebras, etc.
In a locally nite theory T
0
, there are restricted nite classes which are
representatives, up to T
0
-equivalence, of the whole classes of 
a
0
-ground liter-
als, clauses, quantier-free sentences, etc. (they are just the ground literals,
clauses, quantier-free sentences, etc. containing only the above mentioned
terms t
1
; : : : ; t
k
a
). As it is evident that we can limit information exchange to
ground positive clauses and quantier-free sentences in that restricted class,
both Theorems 3.1, 3.2 yield combined decision procedures for the clausal word
problem in T
1
[T
2
in case the above assumptions (I) and (III) are satised and
in case T
0
is locally nite. In particular, Theorem 3.1 suggest the following
extension of the Nelson-Oppen procedure [13]:
Algorithm 1
Step 1: Negate, skolemize and purify the universal closure of the input clause
C thus producing a set  
1
of ground 
a
1
-literals and a set  
2
of ground 
a
2
-
literals (then  
1
[  
2
is T
1
[ T
2
-equisatisable with :8xC). During the next
Steps loop, positive ground 
a
0
-clauses are added to  
1
; 
2
.
Step 2: Using the decision procedures for T
1
; T
2
, check whether T
1
[  
1
and
T
2
[  
2
are consistent or not (if one of them is not, return `T
1
[ T
2
j= C').
Step 3: If T
i
[ 
i
entails some positive ground 
a
0
-clause (atom in the 
0
-convex
case) not entailed by T
j
[  
j
(j 6= i) add this positive ground clause (atom) to
 
j
and go back to Step 2.
Step 4: If this step is reached, return `T
1
[ T
2
6j= C'.
Example 4.1 Let T
1
be rational linear arithmetic and let T
2
be the theory
of total orders endowed with a strict monotonic function f . We take as T
0
the theory of total orders (recall that its model completion T

0
is the theory
of dense total orders without endpoints). T
1
is known to be decidable and the
clausal word problem for T
2
is decidable too. As T
1
 T

0
, T
1
is certainly T
0
-
compatible. T
2
is also T
0
-compatible (to embed a modelM of T
2
into a model
M
0
of T

0
[T
2
, take as M
0
the lexicographic product ofM with e.g. the poset
of rational numbers). Thus our combination results apply and we obtain the
decidability of the clausal word problem for rational linear arithmetic endowed
with a strict monotonic function.
Example 4.2 A modal algebra is a Boolean algebra B = hB;\; 1;[; 0; ( )
0
i
endowed with an operator 2 preserving binary meets and the top element. Let
now 
1
be the signature of Boolean algebras augmented with a unary function
symbol 2
1
and let 
2
be the signature of Boolean algebras augmented with
a unary function symbol 2
2
. T
1
is the equational theory of a variety V
1
of
modal algebras and T
2
is the equational theory of another variety V
2
of modal
algebras. For i = 1; 2, T
i
is a universal Horn theory, hence it is 
i
-convex: this
28
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means in particular that the solvability of the conditional word problem for
T
i
implies the solvability of the clausal word problem for T
i
. As every model
of T
i
embeds into a model whose Boolean reduct is atomless, we can conclude
that the solvability of the conditional word problem for T
1
and T
2
implies the
solvability of the conditional word problem for T
1
[T
2
. Also, in case the modal
operators 2
1
;2
2
are both transitive,
8
the solvability of the word problem for
T
1
and T
2
implies the solvability of the word problem for T
1
[ T
2
.
We underline that the last observation, once read in terms of logics, means
exactly fusion decidability for normal extensions of K4. Although this does not
entirely cover Wolter's fusion decidability results [19], it puts some substantial
part of them into the appropriate general combination context. For new results
(based on a renement of the combination schema explained in this section)
concerning fusion of modal logics sharing a universal modality and nominals,
see [7].
5 Pure deductions
In this section we give some further suggestions about a possible use of the
ideas explained in section 3 within saturation-based theorem proving. We
show that whenever T
0
-compatibility holds it is possible to cut in a deduction
the inferences which are not pure, still retatining refutational completeness.
An inference among (
1
[ 
2
)
a
-clauses
C
1
; : : : ; C
n
C
is pure i there is i = 1; 2 such that all the clauses C
1
; : : : ; C
n
; C are 
a
i
-
clauses. Similarly, a deduction is pure i all inferences in it are pure. Usually
pure deductions are not able to detect inconsistency of (the skolemization of)
sets of sentences like T
1
[  
1
[ T
2
[  
2
, however we shall see that this may
happen when the T
0
-compatibility conditions are satised.
In order to realize this program, we rst need to skolemize the theo-
ries T
1
; T
2
, thus passing to theories T
sk
1
; T
sk
2
in extended signatures 
sk
1
;
sk
2
;
Skolem functions will not be considered shared symbols, hence we still have
that 
0
= 
sk
1
\ 
sk
2
. The rst problem we meet is the following: if T
i
is
T
0
-compatible, is T
sk
i
still T
0
-compatible? We do not have a general answer
for that, however there is a relevant case in which the answer is aÆrmative:
Proposition 5.1 Let T be a -theory which is compatible with respect to a

0
-theory T
0
(here 
0
is a subsignature of ). If the axioms of T are all
8
The modal operator 2
i
is said to be transitive i T
i
j= 2
i
x\2
i
2
i
x = 2
i
x. For transitive
modal operators it is easily seen that the conditional word problem reduces to the word
problem.
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89-sentences, then T
sk
is T
0
-compatible too.
The previous Proposition motivates the following extra assumption (in
addition to those from section 3):
Assumption (IV). T
1
, T
2
are axiomatized by 89-sentences; T
sk
1
; T
sk
2
are their
skolemizations.
We take into consideration here the Superposition Calculus I (see [3], [12]).
We x a lexicographic path ordering
9
induced by a total precedence on the
symbols of 
sk
1
[ 
sk
2
[ fag; assuming for simplicity that our signatures are
nite, this induces a reduction ordering > which is total on ground terms.
We give to symbols in 
a
0
lower precedence than to symbols in 
sk
1
n
0
and in

sk
2
n
0
. This is essential: as a consequence, ground 
a
0
-clauses will be smaller
in the twofold multiset extension of > than all ground clauses containing a
proper 
1
or 
2
-symbol.
Theorem 5.2 In the above assumptions (I)-(IV), the set of sentences T
1
[
 
1
[T
2
[ 
2
is inconsistent i there is a pure I-derivation of the empty clause
from T
sk
1
[  
1
[ T
sk
2
[  
2
.
A possible direction for future reseach should try to take advantage from
Theorem 5.2 in decision procedures based on Superposition Calculus: in fact
for interesting (intrinsecally non locally nite) theories, the Superposition Cal-
culus terminates whenever it has to test satisability of nite sets of ground
literals [1].
Before concluding this section, we shall provide an example in which the
assumptions of Theorem 5.2 are satised and an example in which such as-
sumptions fail.
Example 5.3 Let T
1
; T
2
be both the theory of Boolean algebras; we assume
that symbols of the bounded distributivity lattice language (namely \;[; 0; 1)
are shared but that the two complements n
1
; n
2
are not. We want to prove
that T
1
[ T
2
j= 8x(n
1
(x) = n
2
(x)): If we take T
0
to be the theory of bounded
distributive lattices (i.e. of distributive lattices with 0 and 1), we see that
T
1
; T
2
are T
0
-compatible. Skolemization and purication give for instance the
two sets of literals  
1
= fa = n
1
(c); a 6= bg and  
2
= fb = n
2
(c); a 6= bg.
A pure I-refutation exists: the prover SPASS produces a pure I-refutation
consisting on 28 steps. However, the system is not programmed in order to
avoid impure inferences, so that, during saturation, it impurely derives also
(useless) `mixed' clauses containing both n
1
and n
2
. One of them, namely the
atom b \ n
1
(n
2
(a)) = b, is also selected as a given clause.
Example 5.4 Let T
1
be the theory of Boolean algebras and let T
2
be the
theory of pseudocomplemented distributive lattices; these are bounded dis-
tributive lattices endowed with a unary operator ( )

satisfying the condition
9
It is not clear whether the results explained in this section hold in case a Knuth-Bendix
ordering is adopted.
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8x8y (x \ y = 0 $ y  x

): This condition expresses the properties of in-
tuitionistic negation, hence in the union theory T
1
[ T
2
, the operator ( )

collapses into the classical complement. This means that T
1
[  
1
[ T
2
[  
2
is
inconsistent, where  
1
is empty and  
2
is f(a

)

6= ag. A SPASS refutation
takes 43 lines and it is highly impure. In fact a pure refutation cannot exist:
the 
0
- (and even the 
a
0
)-ground clauses deducible from either T
1
[  
1
or
T
2
[  
2
are insuÆcient to detect inconsistency, because they are all subsumed
by the three negative literals 0 6= 1; a 6= 1; a 6= 0. Notice that T
2
is not
T
0
-compatible.
6 Conclusions and related work
In this paper we have extended Nelson-Oppen combination procedure to the
case of theories T
1
; T
2
over non-disjoint signatures, in presence of compatibility
conditions over a common universal subtheory T
0
. The extension we proposed
applies to examples of real interest giving, as shown in section 4, combined
decidability in case T
0
is locally nite. Whenever T
0
is not locally nite, our
method can be used in order to limit residue exchange (see section 3) or in
order to forbid impure inferences in saturation-based theorem proving, thus
yielding restrictions on the search space during refutation derivations (see
section 5).
It should be noticed that quantier-elimination plays only an indirect role
in the paper: in this sense, the existence of a model completion for a uni-
versal theory T
0
guarantees a certain behaviour in combination problems by
itself, independently on how quantier elimination in the model completion is
established (this can be established also by semantic non constructive argu-
ments, as largely exemplied in the model-theoretic literature). In principle,
the quantier elimination complexity/decidability has nothing to do with the
complexity/decidability of our combination methods, simply because quanti-
er elimination algorithms do not enter into them. This is crucial, because
most quantier elimination algorithms are subject to heavy complexity lower
bounds, which are often structural lower bounds for the decision of the ele-
mentary word problem in the corresponding theories [5].
One may wonder how severe is the crucial condition of T
0
-compatibility
used in the paper: let us discuss it for a while. T
0
-compatibility involves
two aspects, namely the existence of a model completion T

0
for T
0
and the
embeddability of models of T
i
into models of T
i
[ T

0
. As we have shown
in the examples, the existence of a model completion seems to be frequent
for theories commonly used in software verication. On one side, numeric
constraint theories often enjoy this property, in the sense that they eliminate
quantiers (thus being model completions of the theories axiomatized by their
respective universal consequences). On the other side, acyclic binary lists
might probably be the paradigm of situations arising in theories axiomatizing
natural datatypes. Finally, notice that quantier elimination strictly depends
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on the choice of the language: every theory trivially has quantier elimination
in an extended language with innitely many denitional axioms, hence the
problem of obtaining quantier elimination seems to be mostly a problem of
choosing a suÆciently rich but still natural and manageable language.
The question concerning embeddability of models of T
i
into models of T
i
[
T

0
looks more problematic, in the sense that it can fail in signicant situations
and, in addition, it does not look to be mechanizable. Further research is
necessary on this point, however we underline that there is a relevant case in
which the problem disappears. This is the case in which T
i
is an extension of
T

0
: we have seen an example in section 4 where T
i
is rational linear arithmetic
and T
0
is the theory of linear orders. Another example is the theory of acyclic
lists L (which coincides with L

): any extension of the theory of acyclic lists
with signicant extra structures matches our requirements and the advantages
of our method (limited residue exchange, elimination of impure inferences,
etc.) apply to all combinations of theories obtained in this way.
There have been many eorts in the literature trying to extend Nelson-
Oppen combination method to theories sharing function and predicate sym-
bols (dierent from equality). The starting point of any attempt to generalize
Nelson-Oppen procedure to the non-disjoint case should preliminarly answer
the following question: what is the specic feature of the stable inniteness
requirement that we want to generalize? In the present paper we answered the
question by saying that innite models are just existentially closed models of
the pure theory of equality and based our further investigations on this obser-
vation. On the contrary, in other approaches (see e.g. [17]), it is emphasized
that innite models are just free models of the pure theory of equality with
innitely many generators. This leads to completely dierent results, because
the notion of innitely generated free and of existentially closed structure are
quite divergent and their coincidence for the pure theory of equality must be
considered a rather exceptional fact.
Before closing, we would like to remark that the idea (suggested in [15]) of
using interpolation theorems in order to limit residue exchange in partial the-
ory reasoning (whenever the background reasoner has to deal with combined
theories) inspired some of the material presented in section 3 above. Notice
however the following dierence with respect to [15]: there the input theories
T
1
; T
2
were assumed to share all functions symbols (alien function symbols be-
longing to one theory being considered as free Skolem functions for the other),
whereas we tried to keep function symbols separated too, as much as possi-
ble. This is essential in our context, because otherwise e.g. local niteness
of the common subtheory T
0
would be lost (and decidability of the combined
problems presented in section 4 would not be achieved as a consequence).
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